Asia Times
The battle for space supremacy is escalating as China’s covert maneuvers, Russia’s killer satellites and the US’s quest for flexible orbital warfare capabilities converge to create future conflicts in space, writes Gabriel Hornada for the Asia Times.
This month, Air & Space Forces magazine reported that China’s aggressive orbital maneuvers in geosynchronous orbit have prompted US space leaders to seek improved maneuvering capabilities.
Air & Space Forces Magazine noted that China has launched nearly 1,000 satellites since 2010, with recent activities including high-speed launches, orbital warfare techniques and evasion tactics.
The report highlights the risks posed by China’s dynamic satellite maneuvers, which involve inspecting, moving or damaging other satellites. The maneuvers are unusual for geosynchronous orbit and are designed to avoid detection and destruction, the report said.
The report said that the commander of the US Space Forces, General Stephen Whiting, has stressed the need for a sustainable space maneuver capability, citing China’s use of new orbits and in-orbit refueling.
It also mentions that Brigadier General Anthony Mastaler warned of a paradigm shift requiring the US to adapt. The report also mentions that Lieutenant General Douglas Shays has noted the potential for “air combat in space” due to the maneuvering capabilities of Russian and Chinese satellites.
Air & Space Forces magazine notes that the US aims to develop systems such as the X-37B space plane to reduce operational surprise and overcome orbital regimes.
In addition to the X-37B spaceplane, Defense Scoop reported in October 2024 that the U.S. Space Force has awarded a $34.5 million contract to California-based startup Impulse Space to demonstrate in-orbit maneuverability for its tactical responsive space program.
According to Defense Scoop, the contract includes the delivery of two Orbital Maneuvering Vehicles (OMVs) for the Victus Surgo and Victus Salo missions. The report notes that these missions are intended to test the ability of pre-positioned space assets to rapidly respond to threats in orbit.
Defense Scoop mentions that the U.S. Space Force is seeking to improve its response to space threats and aims to achieve operational tactical responsive space capabilities by 2026. It also says that the upcoming Victus Haze mission, scheduled for 2025, is intended to test maneuverable space vehicles.
Asia Times previously reported in February 2022 that the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had awarded contracts to General Atomics, Lockheed Martin and Blue Origin to develop nuclear propulsion systems for low-Earth orbit (LEO) demonstrations by 2025.
This technology, which uses nuclear fission to accelerate fuel, offers significant advantages over traditional chemical propulsion, including greater endurance, greater payload capacity and double the fuel efficiency.
These improvements could shift space combat from passive “detect and respond” to active “position and maneuver” strategies. They allow the application of traditional military principles – agility, concentration and maneuverability – to space operations.
Maneuverability could also address the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Most follow predictable trajectories, making them susceptible to tracking and targeting by anti-satellite weapons. This predictability allows adversaries to plan and execute attacks with greater precision.
Adversary satellites employing “hunt and disable” tactics—actively seeking, inspecting, or damaging critical space assets—pose a significant threat to space security.
These tactics involve satellites maneuvering to approach and potentially interfere with other satellites, raising concerns about deliberate interference or hostile action.
For example, NPR reported in May 2024 that the US has accused Russia of launching a satellite, Kosmos 2576, which is likely an anti-space weapon. NPR says the satellite, launched from the Plesetsk launch site in northern Russia, is in the same orbital plane as the US spy satellite USA 314, which is part of the Keyhole 11 series.
According to NPR, the US claims that Kosmos 2576’s proximity to USA 314, approximately 30 miles at its closest point, suggests it could be used to inspect, move, or damage other satellites.
The report notes that the maneuver has increased tensions between the two nations, with the US monitoring the satellite for possible threatening behavior. NPR says Russia has dismissed the accusations, calling them “fake news” and saying it opposes the deployment of weapons in space.
Asia Times reported in August 2022 that the Russian satellite Kosmos-2558 is suspected of being a “satellite-inspector” with potential hunter-killer capabilities. Analysts believe it could monitor and potentially destroy US spy satellites, raising concerns about the militarization of space.
This month, Kosmos-2558 came within 75 kilometers of the USA-326 satellite, which carries a classified payload for space reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
The US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has expressed concern about the satellite’s proximity and potential threat. Russia has a history of deploying satellites with similar capabilities, including Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504, which have been conducting close-range maneuvers since 2013.
Charles Galbraith mentioned in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Research, the U.S. Space Force should explore plans to deploy “hunter-killer” satellites, leveraging the flexibility and affordability of SmallSats (small maneuverable satellites) to bolster space superiority.
Galbraith says these hunter-killer satellites are designed to operate as co-orbital weapons capable of disabling enemy satellites through kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, laser targeting, jamming, and jamming.
He notes that patrolling near enemy assets, hiding in less observable orbits, or remaining dormant aboard larger spacecraft until activated improves the U.S. Space Force’s ability to conduct offensive counterspace operations on short notice.
Additionally, Galbreath says these satellites could act as “bodyguards” for high-value space assets, much like fighter jets escort bombers, thereby protecting critical systems like missile warning satellites from attack.
He notes that the adoption of SmallSats for this role is due to their low cost, rapid development cycles, and potential for mass deployment, allowing the U.S. to counter the growing space warfare capabilities of China and Russia.
Galbreath says the combination of precision targeting, operational flexibility, and the ability to achieve effects without generating orbital debris underscores the transformative potential of SmallSats in U.S. military space operations.
The rules of war regarding attacks on satellites, however, are not crystal clear. In the 2023 book “Who Owns Outer Space?” Michael Byers and Aaron Bowley note that the legal debate over whether an attack on a satellite constitutes an act of war has centered on interpretations of the principles of jus ad bellum (the right to wage war) and jus in bello (conduct in war).
Byers and Bowley say that proponents argue that satellite attacks can qualify as armed force under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, primarily if they significantly damage state assets or disrupt essential services such as communications or navigation.
They point to the reliance on satellites for military, economic, and civilian functions, suggesting that targeting these assets may justify invoking self-defense under Article 51.
Conversely, they note that opponents note that not all satellite attacks meet the threshold of “armed attack,” especially if the effects are non-destructive, such as signal jamming or hacking.
Furthermore, Byers and Bowley point out that the dual use of satellites complicates the attribution and assessment of intent, making classifying such actions as military action a challenge.
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