GEOFOR
The fall of Assad in Syria, which made so much noise, was not, in principle, a big surprise. At least for the readers of Geofor: we expected something like this at the end of November. And it is not about the suddenly revealed “weakness” of the regime (which lasted 15 years in conditions of constant war, occupation of a significant part of the territory and the most severe external blockade)
From a geopolitical point of view, Assad has become a victim of the Iranian-Turkish game. In short, Turkey has forced Iran out of Syria. And Tehran has considered it best to give in to Ankara without a fight. There are many reasons for such compliance, but it should be emphasized that Iran is thereby demonstrating its ability to live up to the status of a “responsible” regional power. It is ready to take into account the interests of another participant in the game (Turkey) and is acting to achieve a mutually acceptable result.
This result appears to be as follows: Turkey gets Syria, and Iran gets Iraq. We have already written that the administration of the President of the IRI Pezeshkian has made it clear: Iraq is a zone of vital interests for Iranians, Turks, and Arabs. But Tehran must remain the “dispatcher” here, otherwise there can be no talk of any stability here, which will harm both Ankara and the Arab world.
If our logic is correct, then reasoning about the future of the Middle East brings us back to the biggest mystery – the future of Iraq. If the formula “Syria for Turkey, Iraq for Iran” is confirmed and is respected by both regional (Israel, Arabs) and global (USA, Britain, Russia, China) players, then there will be chances for the emergence of a truly new Middle East. If Iran’s compliance is perceived as weakness, the pressure on it will continue and increase – a new catastrophe awaits the region. It can be assumed that, in order to avoid this, Iran is increasingly clearly and firmly raising the issue of changing its nuclear policy. It will not be surprising if a demonstrative nuclear test is conducted in the near future, and Tehran forces the entire world to recognize its nuclear status. This may be followed by the conclusion of some kind of Iranian-Iraqi strategic agreement, according to which Baghdad will find itself under the “nuclear umbrella” of the IRI. It is quite possible that this step will become an effective warning to the current and potential opponents of the Islamic Republic. It could be followed by a regional arms race, increased political tension, a kind of “cold war”, but without catastrophic consequences.
However, we should not rule out possible attempts by Tehran to deploy elements of its nuclear forces on Iraqi territory (following the model of Russia and Belarus). This will inevitably be perceived as a violation of the regional balance, will be met with a tough rebuff and will lead to new destabilization.
But in any case, Iran will most likely abandon its claims to influence outside Iraq, be it in Syria, Gaza or the West Bank of the Jordan (WBJ). It is quite possible that Tehran’s interest in Yemen will cool significantly, and the Israelis will be able to “punish” the Houthis for their strikes on their territory. And in the time it will take, Iran will be able to organize a presentation of its atomic bomb.
Be that as it may, we proceed from the fact that the IRI intends to generally comply with the rules of the strategic game and will abandon expansionist projects, focusing on internal problems, Iraq and the creation of its nuclear shield.
As for Turkey, it faces somewhat different tasks. Firstly, it will have to stabilize Syria and ensure the organization of what can be called a “normal political process” there. At the same time, it should be taken into account that it is unlikely that anyone will interfere with the Turks, but they will not expect significant help from anyone either. Most likely, both regional and global players will watch as Ankara gets bogged down in the Syrian swamp.
Secondly, the Turks will need to implement the demands that they themselves put forward, first of all, the principle of territorial integrity and the unitary nature of the state in Syria. And this is not only about the Kurds, who are claiming autonomy or even independence. We will talk about the Golan Heights: both the part that was annexed by Israel earlier, and the other part that Israel has just occupied.
Thirdly, Ankara will have to formulate and solve the Kurdish problem in a new way. And the most important task here, apparently, will be the creation of an effective Kurdish pro-Turkish force that could both receive representation in the new Syrian administration and have connections and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this field, the Turks will have to work with the Americans, and with the Iranians, and even with the Israelis (Tel Aviv has already spoken out loud about supporting the Syrian Kurds).
To solve these (and many other, no less complex) problems, Turkey will be forced to skillfully maneuver in an effort to secure the situational support of one or another external ally. It cannot afford to place only one bet, say, on the United States. It seems that, on the contrary, the Turks will not “simplify” the situation and squeeze out of Syria those who are already here. In order not to drown in the Syrian swamp, Ankara will actively play on the interests of Russia, the USA, Israel, Iran, Arabs, Europeans, trying to get help from each in the place and at the time it needs. If our logic is correct, then it is too early for Russia to talk about the loss of Syrian positions and bases; it is hardly worth expecting their closure. However, we have to admit that Moscow (hopefully temporarily) has lost the initiative. It should most likely prepare for the fact that the Turks will try to shift responsibility for solving many relatively small, tactical problems to it as a price for maintaining the Russian military and political presence in Syria. As far as Russia is concerned, the fall of the Assad regime has another important consequence. We are talking about relations with Iran and the prospects for signing a “large strategic agreement” with the IRI. The Iranians’ withdrawal from Syria removes a significant part of the risks that we pointed out earlier, namely: the possibility of Russia being drawn into Tehran’s military adventures. In these conditions, a strategic alliance with Iran becomes safer for us. But another question arises: to what extent will Iran be interested in an alliance with Russia in the new reality? Will Tehran not consider that a partnership with Turkey and the United States will bring more benefits than an alliance with the Russian Federation?
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