Parvan Simeonov: Peevski’s endless political expansion may hit a wall at some point

Author: Krasen Nikolov, mediapool.bg 23 Nov 2024

“The DPS started as a party with illegal origins and went on the path to becoming a union of all marginalized communities. This refers to the ethnically ghettoized communities, the communities in Northwestern Bulgaria and everywhere else. I say this with a bitter smile, because we have been observing these processes for a long time. In these communities, the DPS shows an affinity for extremely pragmatic methods of gaining votes, and Peevski has shown unequivocal leadership in this niche,” says the executive director of Gallup International Balkans Parvan Simeonov in an interview with Krasen Nikolov and Mediapool.

• Mr. Simeonov, has the DPS already been taken over by Delyan Peevski? Does Dogan have a useful move?
• I don’t think that Peevski has taken over the DPS. This is a process that has taken place in recent years through the natural succession of generations in the DPS. In this case, the far more energetic, pragmatic and expansive Peevski has managed to gradually gain control over the party naturally. The party active has seen much more of Peevski than of Dogan. Dogan had really remained in the honorary chairman position. What is happening is that Dogan tried to get the party back, not that Peevski took it from him.
• What is the DPS becoming at the moment?
• The DPS started as a party with illegal origins and is on its way to becoming a union of all marginalized communities. This refers to ethnically ghettoized communities, communities in Northwestern Bulgaria and elsewhere. I say this with a bitter smile, because we have been observing these processes for a long time. In these communities, the DPS shows an affinity for extremely pragmatic methods of gaining votes, and Peevski has shown unequivocal leadership in this niche.
• What is Dogan’s useful move?
• Dogan’s useful move will have to start with his own enlightenment. He must show tact towards Bulgarian society as a whole. Because the apologies we have heard so far from the Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (the name under which Dogan’s formation is participating in the elections on October 27 – bellred.), will hardly be a sufficient incentive for many to recognize Peevski as bad and Dogan as good. It will take some more time to go. But otherwise, yes, undoubtedly in this situation, in a strange, slightly paradoxical way, Dogan is starting to look a little more sympathetic than Peevski.
• If we go to another early election in April, which seems possible, will Peevski be able to gain control over all the strongholds of the MRF?
• Logic tells us, although we cannot always think logically about these things, that some of the people remaining around Dogan may also be guided by strength. And the strength is with Peevski. Dogan will try to avoid new elections so that he can strengthen himself and hope that public intolerance towards Peevski will reach a level where his influence will be limited. And of course, if new elections are held, they should not be held by this caretaker cabinet, but by the caretaker cabinet of the president. Dogan will want to have guarantees of more decisive action against vote buying or against controlled voting in general.
• And what will the rest want?
• This is everyone else’s game. This may also turn out to be Borisov’s game, because in the next elections, if Peevski is even stronger, Borisov would really like to get out of his shadow. It seems that at the beginning Borisov was counting on Dogan to defeat Peevski, but that didn’t happen. Now Borisov will count on Radev to defeat Peevski in some way. This is the game of the others as well, but I don’t see them succeeding. Peevski is politically isolated, but it seems that he clearly has his own access to many other systems. He is isolated as an image, but the others are not managing to surround him, at least for now. I don’t see anyone creating a cordon sanitaire in the true sense of the word. There is something else. Even if another caretaker government were to hold the elections, Peevski could still have a solid result. Many talk about direct vote buying, but we are no longer talking exactly about direct vote buying. We are talking about a controlled vote or a predictable vote. These are people who depend on clientelistic networks, on employers, on mayors. Or entire election commissions that depend on these networks, as you can see. I’m afraid to say it, but this may be the new “normal” in many areas of the country where there is no human capital to hold normal elections. Not to mention that politics offers no other inspiration than a few leva. Once every quarter.
• Can it be said that the MRF is no longer an ethnic party?
• For a long time, the MRF has been turning into a union of marginalized communities in Bulgaria. This is a blessed niche, because in Bulgaria there are not a few losers from the transition and they are not encapsulated ethnically. The Alliance for Rights and Freedoms remained more of an ethnic party, because there is almost entirely Turkish voting there. There is another danger. Let it not happen that a parallel political competition is formed in the ethnic niche. This is happening in our neighboring Macedonia, where the Albanian part of society has its own party competition. This is dangerous, because this leads to the hermetic closure of these communities when they make a separate competition. It is doubly dangerous against the background of Peevski’s extremely exotic political style. It is very curious how ethnic relations in the country are entrusted to a person with his political style. I usually listen carefully to these topics, because they are the really important topics in the Balkans, and we usually pass them by lightly. For example, Peevski twice in this rally named an ethnic group that few have heard of, which he called millet (the people of craftsmen, an ethnic community of Turkish origin from Northeastern Bulgaria – editor’s note). This is another self-definition of some communities. Somehow the combination between Peevski’s political style and this topic seems quite explosive to me. We have to be careful with all this, especially here in the Balkans.
• How will Peevski reformat Bulgarian politics as the party leader of the MRF?
• I don’t know. I can’t understand the logic of his actions, because this is endless political expansion. This could hit a wall somewhere. If it continues to grow, at some point it could end up being Peevski against everyone else. Something like in 2020, when Borisov was in this situation. Peevski needs to find more flexible mechanisms to play out the situation, because otherwise he becomes inapplicable to the Bulgarian political agenda.
• This means starting to unload informal power from himself in order to start looking more acceptable.
• Yes, but right now I only see expansion and power politics. What worries me more is that if two parts of an ethnic group start to quarrel, it can always turn out that the arbiter is the metropolis of that ethnic group (i.e. Turkey). Or if two parties quarrel, lest something third emerge, which is already radically ethnic. Because to be honest, both Dogan and Peevski are very careful about this. The concern is whether on their way forward someone will decide to use the ethnic card. It could become a situation in which we replace a known evil with an unknown one.
• How does Peevski fit into the relations between the MRF and Turkey?
• So far, there are no clear signs in this direction. The Turkish state cannot commit to a position on the domestic political Bulgarian case. But Turkey is demographically young and is a power with global ambitions. Ethnic relations in Bulgaria cannot be thought of as something separate from ethnic relations in the Balkans as a whole. Ethnic relations in the Balkans as a whole are a very delicate topic. It is right to really listen to international issues, and not only to the questions of who is corrupt, who buys votes, and so on. The topics of interethnic, interstate issues are also quite important. Reference: the photo of Mr. Peevski with the Ukrainian ambassador, where many, like many, said: But wait a minute, which is worse, corruption or the Kremlin?
• Apparently, Peevski has to position himself in relation to Ankara…
• After the split of the MRF, a space with two extremes has formed. On one side is Peevski, on the other is Radev. And it is becoming increasingly clear that, willingly or unwillingly, a large part of the parties have begun to group around Radev. At least on this topic, Borisov is already expected to decide. As always, he balances in the middle, but now he is invited to decide, but something is in no hurry to decide.
• Why does Borisov not agree to the proposed cordon sanitaire around Peevski for now?
• The easiest thing would be to say that this is so because he has some political dependencies on Peevski. I cannot know for sure, but his political behavior speaks for itself. In recent years, Borisov has always been packaged with Peevski and this is hardly a coincidence. But there is another reason. This is the political posture. Borisov does not like anyone to dictate conditions to him at all. He wants to show the opposite to his like-minded people. On top of all this, it seems to me that Borisov is hoping for internal processes within the PP-DB coalition itself. The differences were clearly visible there. Borisov has not said anything bad about DB for a long time, for example. He always says bad things only about the PP. So it’s possible that this is also a tactical position.
• Are there any chances for a regular government?
• Well, I personally think there are chances, because in new elections, if Peevski grows and if the Radicals grow, Borisov’s mandates will be even fewer.
• What is this thin thread that he can walk on to form a government?
• Borisov has already figured it out. The solution is very pragmatic and slightly ugly. He says the following: Let’s make a mix of the systemic, so to speak, parties. Paradoxically, ITN also sounds like a systemic party. His plan is for the more centrist, more systemic parties to come together and make something like a mainstream majority. In this mix, there will be some tolerance for the “New Beginning” (of Peevski), because it is no secret that there is a “New Beginning” in the BSP and a “New Beginning” in GERB. However, Peevski will not be allowed to come to power through the front door. That is, Borisov invented it. Now, of course, PP and DB see this and don’t like it, but the more pragmatic ones among them will perhaps accept it. Judging by the vote on Wednesday, 19 DB deputies voted with the thesis that Borisov and Peevski are something bad, but “Vazrazhdane” is no better.
• GERB, PP-DB, BSP and ITN is the formula that can be made. There is one nuance here. If I really turn out to be right in my hypothesis that Borisov cannot stand “We continue the change”, he can try to do something with DB, but without PP. This, of course, is an exotic hypothesis, but such possibilities exist now.
• Is Rumen Radev’s entry into party politics approaching?
• The niche for his entry into party politics is very serious. If I were him, I would wait for the end of the mandate, because time continues to work for him. He gets a very good chance, because all eyes are on him again. In a strange way, we go back a little to 2020. In 2020, the unity of blue and red was born, who announced an anti-corruption agenda. Then the axis of Bulgarian politics became East-West because of the war. Well, now we are returning to the axis of corruption-anti-corruption again. We are returning to 2020 again. Of course, everyone has already learned their lessons and no one will be with such unfurled flags.
• This time, the fight against Peevski is presented as a fight against corruption.
• Peevski’s prominence creates an opportunity for Radev to position himself. This is curious, because Borisov also has an interest in this process.
• Could Borisov turn out to be protesting against himself?
• Borisov usually waits for someone else to do this job – in this case, someone to eliminate Peevski and Borisov to join the winning team. However, Dogan fails. Now Borisov is probably counting on Radev. Two things will be important. How well can he play this game and what will he prefer to do? The voices are becoming very strong to reformat our entire statehood, and not just to create a new political movement. And in my opinion, this dilemma will be facing Radev himself. Should he listen to these voices that talk about reformatting the statehood or create a new party? As a political scientist, I would prefer the latter, because I am very afraid of sudden movements. I am not sure that Bulgaria can endure new sudden changes, since it cannot endure even one opening of the parliament.