Elena PONOMAREVA
In the context of the reformatting of world politics, the Balkans remain an important arena for the clash of interests of the leading powers. At present, increased attention is paid to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the partially recognized Republic of Kosovo, united under the neologism “Western Balkans” 1.
On the one hand, this is determined by their relative freedom from political and regulatory restrictions and fiscal requirements of the EU, and on the other, the prospect of European integration is an attractive factor in bargaining for investments and other preferences.
It is no coincidence that since 2012, the Western Balkans have been in the focus of attention of Beijing: the large-scale project “One Belt – One Road” has come to the European periphery. Interest in the region, and not only economic, but also political and humanitarian, is shown by “Eastern players”: Arab monarchies, Iran, historically – Türkiye and even Japan.
Tokyo has had a program called the Western Balkans Cooperation Initiative since 2018. The document’s neutral wording (support for reforms, strengthening of dialogue, “exchange of knowledge and experience” 2) should not be confusing. Japan is another player on the Western team.
As for the interest in the region of Turkey, which is traditionally here, as well as Iran and the Gulf monarchies, all the eastern capitals have their own interests, opportunities and resources. Despite all their differences, the unifying feature of this pool is the Islamic nature of their statehood and a special focus on the Balkan Muslim communities.
Russia is historically connected with the Serbian lands. Periods of world and regional wars, large-scale crises, including the current one, have demonstrated the close connection between Russian and Serbian societies. It is no coincidence that Serbs are often called Balkan Russians. At present, Moscow’s interests are in conflict primarily with the position of Western actors, which is determined by the aggressive nature of their supranational institutions – the EU and NATO. However, it is worth recognizing that in the Balkans the concept of a “collective West” does not work, although solutions can be promoted through the joint efforts of individual countries, as well as supranational, international and transnational structures. Each of the participants plays its own game, and membership in certain alliances is not an obstacle. The analysis of the strategy and tactics in the region of such an influential player as Great Britain is of not only heuristic but also practical interest.
Unchanged strategy, updated tactics
On the eve of the First World War, the British publicist D.E. Baker wrote: “The Balkans and Asia Minor occupy the most important strategic position in the world. They represent the core and center of the Old World, separating and at the same time connecting three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa… The Balkans and Turkey can be used by England for waging war, as well as for trade.
They are located in a place from which it is possible to threaten and attack three continents…” 3.
The parallels between what happened in and around the Balkans in the late 19th – early 20th centuries and the current situation are obvious.
Today, a new geopolitical game is being played out here, in which the shadow global player is still the British, skillfully using the already time-tested methods of persuasion and coercion. In the Western Balkans, as in other regions, the UK strategy consists of two components – continuity and variability. In the first case, we are talking about the country’s special role in the system of international relations, as well as the presence of permanent interests and temporary allies. In the second, the skillful adaptation to new conditions, flexibility, and constant tactical maneuvering are striking. As more than 100 years ago, the Foreign Office “selflessly fights for peace in Europe” 4, understanding this “peace” strictly in British interests, although the methods and tools for achieving them are changing.
Thus, in the late 1990s – early 2000s, Great Britain was in the shadow of its main ally – the United States. The government of Tony Blair positioned its country as a “pivot”, “regional power with global responsibility”5, which creatively implements the principle of “hitting harder than one can”, formulated in 1993 by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. In practice, this means the ability to “compensate for the limited economic potential with military-political instruments”6. Against the backdrop of serious changes and challenges, it is precisely the art of diplomacy, the ability to play in the shadows and “compensate” that maintains London’s status as a global actor. The literal implementation of D. Hurd’s principle took place during the Balkan wars of the late 20th century. By supporting the US course towards an armed scenario of developments in the post-Yugoslav space, the British created conditions for strengthening their positions in the region 7. In the late 90’s, T. Blair and his cabinet became the main conductors of a military solution to the Kosovo conflict. At the anniversary NATO summit (April 1999), the British Prime Minister – “the most militant of the NATO member leaders in the Kosovo war” – persistently demanded a ground operation in Yugoslavia after the allied air forces had suppressed Belgrade’s firepower 8. And a few months before the bombing began, the Foreign Office adopted a resolution that at that time even the bloc’s allies seemed radical. In particular, it was stated that “in the absence of a corresponding UN Security Council resolution, the North Atlantic Alliance may legally conduct military operations for reasons of overriding humanitarian necessity”9.
Using manipulative technologies, London lobbied for a military operation that was needed first and foremost by Washington; the main dividends were then received by American corporations. For such open support, the opposition dubbed Blair “Bush’s poodle” and the prime minister’s behavior “poodle-like”10. At the instigation of the British media, which broadcast the position of the military-political circles of the United Kingdom, a large-scale anti-Serb campaign was launched.
In just one month (from February 24 to March 25, 1999), the leading British media (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, Financial Times, The Economist, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Sun) published a total of 360 articles covering the situation in Kosovo.
The Guardian published the largest number of materials on various aspects of the Kosovo conflict – 9911. All these publications demonized the Serbian side and hushed up the crimes of Albanian militants against the Serbian population.
After the operation was completed (November 1999), it became known that the Blair government had overestimated the number of Albanian victims of “ethnic cleansing” by 40 times 12.
An internal political scandal broke out in the country, and the head of the British Foreign Office, R. Cook, was subjected to harsh criticism.
Great Britain has a huge experience in conducting information operations to demonize opponents.
The anti-Serbian hysteria was in many ways a carbon copy of the “powerful and well-orchestrated Russophobic campaign aimed at inciting hatred towards Russia and Russians” on the eve of the Crimean War 13. The powerful “negative media image” of the Serbs 14 in February-March 1999 yielded results: throughout the conflict, approval of the British government’s actions in the Kosovo issue did not fall below 50%. According to opinion polls conducted in May 1999, 54% of Britons were in favor of military action against Belgrade, 33% were against, and 51% of respondents said that if NATO had to invade Yugoslavia, they would support such an option. Positive attitudes towards a ground operation among NATO member countries were higher only in France (53%) and Denmark (52%) 15.
There was no ground operation, but based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO-led international forces (KFOR/Kosovo Force or KFOR/Kosovo Force) have been deployed on the territory of the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija since 12 June 1999, and the Multinational Task Force Center (MNTF-C) is under British command.
Thus, London directly coordinates the actions of Kosovo officials, since the capital of the polity, Pristina, is located in the Center group zone. Analysts are convinced that all actions of the Kosovo authorities, including the attempt to seize control in Serbian municipalities in the north of the region in the spring and summer of 2023, as well as the “complete dismantling of Serbian institutions in Kosovo” and the transformation of the “office for European integration into a ministry, and the ministry for Kosovo and Metohija into an office” are coordinated by British intelligence services 16. It is also significant that Great Britain, which has never occupied a strong position in the region in economic terms, has maintained 2nd place among the top investors in Kosovo for a number of years, second only to Germany 17.
Rare Earth Craze
The economic sphere was indeed not the main interest of London in the Balkans for a long time. The situation began to change after the discovery of not only the largest, but so far the world’s only deposit of a new mineral containing lithium and boron, jadarite, in the Jadar River valley in Western Serbia. The rights to develop it were obtained by the Rio Tinto Group* concern. In 2017, the company signed a memorandum of understanding with Belgrade on the implementation of the project “Yadar”. The project was actively lobbied by Alan Duncan, then British Minister for Europe and the Americas, and Matthew Palmer, former US Special Representative for the Western Balkans 18. Lithium is the new gold in the modern economy. Without it, it is impossible to produce various types of batteries. The initial cost of the project was estimated at $2.4 billion. According to the Serbian Ministry of Finance, the extraction of raw materials together with local production of storage devices could annually generate up to 12 billion euros for the economy.
According to the design documentation, after the production reaches full capacity, which is expected by 2029, the raw materials obtained at the mine will produce 58 thousand tons of lithium carbonate per year 19, which can be used to produce batteries for 1.1 million electric vehicles, which is 17% of their current production in European countries. It is planned that over the 40-year life of the deposit, 2.32 million tons of lithium carbonate will be obtained from the Jadarovski mine, and Serbia will take 2nd place in the world ranking of its producers, second only to Australia 20. But most importantly, if the project is implemented, Serbian lithium can cover up to 90% of Europe’s current needs for raw materials and make Rio Tinto one of the world’s leading producers of this alkali metal 21. Given these prospects, Rio Tinto lobbyists have done everything possible and impossible to ensure that the Serbian government “correctly” responds to the large-scale protests over the extraction of jadarite, which have been going on in the country since 2022: according to activists, the environmental costs of lithium extraction will exceed the potential economic benefits of the project. Under pressure from the street, the project was suspended in 2022, allegedly for additional assessments, but in 2024 its implementation began.
It is significant that a number of analysts see military-political rather than economic interests in the activities of the Anglo-Australian company. The presence of a powerful transnational player in a strategically important area of Serbia – in Loznica near the Drina River (Jadar is its tributary), which supplies many farmlands and is a source of healthy drinking water, is assessed, among other things, as a potential environmental threat 22.
To leave to stay
In the UK-Western Balkans nexus, Brexit was the key event. For many years, London was the driving force behind the Balkans’ European integration.
In 2009, William Hegg, the future Foreign Secretary in the Conservative government, stated in a policy speech on the main directions of foreign policy that the United Kingdom should focus its attention and direct the efforts of the EU countries to the Balkan region 23. It is no coincidence that a number of experts believe that Croatia’s membership in the European Union was largely due to Great Britain 24.
Britain’s formal withdrawal from the European structures meant for its Balkan counterparts “the loss of the main advocate for EU expansion” 25, placing applicants for the coveted membership in the “European waiting room” for an indefinite period of time 26.
This affected not only Kosovo and BiH, in whose political processes Great Britain is involved the most. The desire to join the European Union, according to British experts, has done much more than anything else in transforming Belgrade’s position on Kosovo. Even at the stage of forecasts of possible consequences of Brexit, the loss of the ability to offer an easier and faster path to the EU, “or, more correctly, the loss of the ability to block this path”27, was interpreted as the disappearance of the country’s levers of influence in the region.
Brexit has indeed changed the alignment and balance of power in the region.
Despite its official commitment to a single (or at least devoid of obvious disagreements) line with Brussels on the Western Balkans, having parted with it Great Britain in fact often plays against the EU, sometimes speaking out “spoiler” of European initiatives 28.
Officially, the UK’s membership in the EU, which had lasted since 1973, was terminated at midnight on 31 January 2020, and on 13 December 2021, during a meeting with colleagues from Albania, BiH, North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the polity of Kosovo, UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss announced her intention to “step up efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Balkans” and to establish “closer economic and security ties” in the region 29.
Truss, who went down in history with the shortest premiership, has long since left her political career, but the principles of Britain’s presence in the region have not changed. Economic ties are developing, but security remains the main credo, which is understood as the dominant influence of the North Atlantic Alliance, and London is interested in its expansion. This approach is explained by the need to contain the main geopolitical enemy – Russia, which naturally activates British policy in the Serbian zones.
Thus, in December 2021, retired Royal Air Force Marshal, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 2018 to 2021 and commander of the KFOR unit in the early 2000s, Sir Stuart Peach, was appointed to the post of UK Representative in the Western Balkans. According to British politicians, this decision is a “clear indicator of the UK’s commitment to the Western Balkans” and will lead to “deepening ties and working together to deter malign actors” 30. Specifically, the UK Special Representative has the authority to assist the work of the High Representative’s office in BiH, and in Serbia and Kosovo, together with British partners, he should facilitate the continuation of the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, mediated by the EU. London “promotes” not the interests of the Serbs, but of the Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslims. The UK has made special efforts to combat international crime and terrorism. In particular, in July 2018, the creation of the Organized Crime Observatory was announced in London In particular, the 77th British Brigade for psychological operations was stationed here. Intelligence officers are actively working with civil society, primarily along religious lines 34.
The change of government cabinets does not affect the country’s Balkan policy. The new program documents set the goals of assisting the Balkan countries from Whitehall in creating conditions for “stability and prosperity for NATO partners” (these are Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro)
and maintaining “progress in achieving the goals of European integration” for BiH, Serbia and Kosovo 35.
Constant tactical maneuvering, adaptation to changes in the geometry of international relations, including the “special relationship” with the United States, have consolidated the foreign policy principle of “hitting harder than one can.” This approach works productively in the strategy of reducing the influence of third countries. For example, the UK was concerned about Russia’s activism long before the NWO: various concerns about this were the subject of a 2018 House of Lords report. The pool of undesirable players in the region at that time included China, Turkey and the Gulf States 36.
This analytical document differs significantly from the strategic guidelines of both Brussels and Washington. Considering the solution of the most costly and complex issues for the Western Balkans through the prism of Euro-Atlantic integration, London is forming its own system of “maximum advantageous integration into the internal economic and political processes” of the region 37. Responsibility for any failed initiatives can always be placed on the slow and greedy Brussels bureaucracy, as well as the American “cowboys” who are accustomed to acting impudently and not taking into account national specifics.
Thus, the main difference in the policy of Great Britain is the understanding of the Balkan problems exclusively in the context of its global strategy, the key point of which was to counter the expansion of third countries (be it the USA, Russia or China) in the Middle East. The close relationship between the Middle Eastern and Balkan directions of British policy was determined back in the late 19th century within the framework of the Great Game. Today, as before, the activation of London’s policy in the Balkans depends on the need to impose its game in other regions of the world.
Thus, the United Kingdom’s policy in the Balkans is distinguished by “an unchanging strategy and updated tactics” 38. Since the collapse of the USSR and the world socialist system, the efforts of Great Britain have been aimed at creating, on the one hand, its own spheres and zones of influence in the Balkans, and on the other, a collective system of managing political and economic processes in the region. Ideally, the Balkans should have become more controllable and predictable. However, as international tensions increased, the Western first-tier states (Great Britain, Germany, the United States, France) began to view the region as an important element of a new system of containment of Russia. Since the beginning of the NWO in Ukraine, this significance of the “soft underbelly” of the Old World has increased. Currently, the Balkans and, more broadly, South-Eastern Europe represent a “geopolitical space where Western structures and countries are actively developing a system of military-political presence, … a new “Eastern Wall” being formed from the Black Sea to the Baltics” 39. However, despite the general similarity of the policy of presence in the region, the goals and tactics of achieving them by world powers are different.
“The Euro-America of the Western world” 40 seeks to secure a special position in the region. Of course, the focus on “a blow beyond one’s strength” does not mean the ability to jump above one’s head. No matter how sophisticated London’s policy, the Foreign Office is unable to change the global trend – the gradual loss of former influence. And yet, Great Britain manages to balance between Europe and America and to play the “role of the “core”” 41, without which it is difficult to resolve many issues.
London’s main profile in the region is security. Hence the involvement in all processes related to international terrorism and crime, including cyberspace. Even after the loss of the main trump card following Brexit – the ability to influence the acceleration and facilitation of the process of European integration of the Western Balkan countries – London continues to be consulted on all pressing issues. Trying to pursue its policy, depending on the goals and objectives, Whitehall cooperates with Washington against Brussels (this happens most often) and vice versa. The main points of action of the British intelligence services and diplomats are Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo. In the current reality, the situation in the Balkans depends primarily on the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis (specifically on the place and role of Russia in the world policy based on its results) and the possible withdrawal of the United States from the European periphery.
In any case, this “withdrawal” (if it happens) will not affect the security sphere, but Washington has already largely placed the burden of political responsibility for the Western Balkans on the EU.
Whether European countries weakened by internal problems will be able to bear it does not seem to be a rhetorical question. In the “murky” and poorly predictable political processes in the region, the role of Great Britain as a shadow player may increase, and with it the problems of the Western Balkan countries.
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